# AFF Answers

## Cong Threats Answers

### 2AC – Solvency -- Congressional Threats Fail

#### Congress is an illegitimate actor – structural problems destroy credibility.

Mann and Ornstein 12 [Thomas Mann is a 2012 FP Global Thinker and is a senior fellow at the Brookings institution and Norman Ornstein is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a weekly columnist at Roll Call, and co-author, with Thomas Mann of It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism, Norman Ornstein 12 [Thomas Mann, Norman Ornstein, 11-26-2012, Yes, Congress Is That Bad, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/26/yes-congress-is-that-bad/] Eric

What has gone wrong? Two sources of dysfunction are central to the current impasse:

The first is a mismatch between the checks and balances built into the U.S. system and the extreme polarization now separating the two major political parties. By constitutional design, U.S. policymaking moves slowly; the president cannot dictate what happens in Congress, and legislators use separate procedures in the House and Senate that then must be reconciled to write law. In the past, eventual compromise was the standard outcome, at least when some legislators worked across party lines. Not anymore.

The Democratic and Republican parties have been moving apart ideologically since the 1970s, but in the past 10 years this has dramatically accelerated. For the first time in the more than three decades since National Journal began compiling vote ratings for the U.S. Senate, the tallies for the last Congress showed that there was not a single Democrat more conservative than the most liberal Republican; the center, in other words, cannot hold — because it has disappeared. Instead, American parties now resemble parliamentary parties: Party leaders crack the whip, and fewer members are willing to flout orders and compromise. The result: gridlock.

The second major dysfunction has to do with the asymmetry of this polarization. The Republican Party has become the home of ideologically extreme insurgents who shun conventionally understood facts, evidence, and science, and scorn the very idea of working out compromises with a legitimate political opposition. This radicalized GOP is now willing to use all the levers in the constitutional system even if it means delay and deadlock.

In a parliamentary system, a fiercely oppositional minority party is to be expected. In the American system, it cannot work. With the Republicans deciding to use the filibuster in the Senate as a routine tool of obstruction (they have resorted to the filibuster with a frequency in the last three years unprecedented in U.S. history), passing legislation now in effect requires not a majority but 60 votes out of 100. What’s more, any legislation that manages to pass under those conditions, taken without broad bipartisan consensus, divides the country and is seen by many as illegitimate or ill-advised. That is the story of Barack Obama’s first two years in office. Democrats, who were in charge of both the House and Senate, pushed through a wide range of measures from health-care reform to economic stimulus to financial regulation, but the minority made a concerted effort to delegitimize them.

What came after was even worse: The 2010 midterm elections produced a divided-party government, genuine gridlock, and the least productive Congress in memory. This year saw the enactment of only 83 laws, a quarter of them naming post offices or making other symbolic acts. Of course, quality is more important than quantity (whatever else the famous "do-nothing" 80th Congress did, it passed the Marshall Plan). In the case of this 112th Congress, however, the quality is as abysmal as the quantity; the most significant public-policy action was the debacle surrounding the debt ceiling, which resulted in the first credit-rating downgrade in America’s history. Now, following that reckless hostage-taking of what should have been a standard legislative act, a totally unnecessary "fiscal cliff" looms, threatening another recession. The problems here are not redeemable with quick fixes because the divisions are tribal and the problems are as much cultural as structural.

This lethal combination of forces has serious implications not just for America’s ability to solve its problems; it also poisons America’s standing in the world — its ability to project its values abroad, garner the trust and respect of allies, and serve as a role model for nascent democracies and a counterpoint to autocracies.

#### Partisanship and the news cycle destroy effective threats.

Warburg 21 [Gerry Warburg is a professor of practice of public policy at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, January 2021, “Congressional Accountability in Shaping United States Foreign Policies 1970-2020,” Center for Effective Policymaking, https://thelawmakers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Working-Paper-Congressional-Accountability-in-US-Foreign-Policy-1.pdf] Eric

Research on this question, supplemented by interviews with leading policymakers, offer details that reveal how profoundly the policymaking environment has been altered.(30)

First, there are ever fewer centrists elected to Congress from either major party, and those that remain find few electoral incentives for taking tough votes on international policy. Consequently, there are fewer Members prepared to place institutional prerogatives over partisan politics. In the late 1980s, there were a dozen liberal Republicans to ‘the left’ of conservative Democrats, often from southern states, and vice versa. In the last Congress, the most conservative senator in the Democratic caucus, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, was still ranked as more liberal than the most moderate Republican, Susan Collins of Maine.(31) Those who challenge party orthodoxy, or who reach across the political aisle to support a bipartisan compromise—or to defend the institutional prerogatives of Congress—are at greater risk of being defeated. As a consequence, Members of both parties have adopted a classic ‘blame avoidance’ strategy to dodge difficult votes while reserving the ability to blame the President for foreign initiatives gone awry.(32) In fact, several powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairmen have lost their re-election bids. The list includes William Fulbright of Arkansas, Frank Church of Idaho and Charles Percy of Illinois. Many incumbents now fear primary election challenges more than general elections. Primary voters defeated relative moderates such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) in 2010, while Trump critic Bob Corker, a popular Tennessee Republican retired unexpectedly in 2019. The muchnoted ‘sorting out’ of parties has significantly increased party-line voting while dis-incentivizing would-be champions of the institution of Congress.(33) This has occurred most notably on domestic issues such as health care—not a single Republican voted for Obamacare, even after Democrats accepted scores of GOP-sponsored amendments. Stimulus spending and tax cuts also became party-line votes in the House. Yet, it also happened on issues like the Iran nuclear pact, where Republicans voted en bloc against an agreement that had been supported by U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence leaders, five United Nations Security Council partners, including key European allies, as well as Russia and China. This party-line voting on security matters and the failure to defend institutional prerogatives “makes it easier for future administrations to just ignore the will of Congress,” Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) observes, “it means there’ll be less and less bipartisanship in defending Congress.(34)

In this hyper-polarized legislative environment, bipartisan coalitions to sustain Washington’s international policy initiatives are very difficult to achieve. This harms U.S. national security interests. Former GOP Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen graphically describes the difficulty of passing even a routine State Department authorization in this environment: “The House Foreign Affairs Committee mark-up on the State Department funding bill suffered from dozens of amendments that were simply about social engineering and political messaging. When you try to bring a bill like that to the floor, with so many divisive social issues, you get a ‘No’ from leadership.”(35) Similarly, nonpartisan efforts to defend the institution of Congress have been weakened. As one former House leader and veteran appropriator, Vic Fazio of California, recently testified, “The job of the minority is now to make sure that the governing majority accomplishes little or nothing.”(36)

A second factor in Capitol Hill’s decline has been the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the rise of social media. Both have made nuanced positioning on breaking foreign developments more difficult. Flip comments by inveterate Twitter users crowd out more thoughtful analysis. Hard line positions are rewarded by voters and locked in early by earned media coverage. The President of the United States boasted by Tweet in 2019 about nominating a poorly qualified, controversial Director of National Intelligence, then counting on the press to ‘vet’ him after the presidential announcement.(37) Legislators also spend far less time in Washington working together. Bipartisan CODELS (“congressional delegations”) making fact-finding missions overseas, have been cut back. In the Senate, leaders have doubled the number of committee assignments while reducing the number of substantive bills given consideration. Consequently, recent research has shown, that there is greater policy diversification and less specialization.(38) Legislators are increasingly generalists, fewer are specialists in foreign or defense policy. The development of policymaking expertise, especially in foreign policy, an area deemed of less interest to voters, is punished rather than rewarded. In addition, term limits on committee chairs—a reform initiative from decades past—has further reduced the development of expertise necessary to stand up to a unified executive branch front led by the President.

A third factor is that the marquee foreign policymaking committees, panels that once wielded the power to check presidents, have themselves declined. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is Exhibit A here. The committee was once a panel led by vigorous challengers to presidential authority. William Fulbright used it to build a national case against the Vietnam War expanded by his political ally, fellow southern Democrat Lyndon Johnson. Frank Church used the panel to build the case for nuclear arms control and the Panama Canal treaties, while checking CIA excesses. Republican Jesse Helms pressed from his leadership position on the panel to curb U.S. support for international organizations.(39) Such was the high esteem of the panel that Senator Jack Kennedy’s father, eager to prepare for the 1960 presidential contrast, implored then-Senate Majority Leader LBJ to grant his son a seat on the panel in the 1950s, blocking a more senior political rival, Estes Kefauver.

In the last Congress, the committee was led by a quiet isolationist from Idaho, Jim Risch, who is not held in high regard by foreign policy experts on both sides of the aisle. The Senate panel that once seated Dick Lugar, John Kerry, Chuck Hagel and Barack Obama still attracts White House aspirants. Ted Cruz of Texas, Rand Paul of Kentucky, and Marco Rubio of Florida all joined the panel prior to their own presidential campaigns. But this panel, and its House counterpart, are now deemed by most legislators less desirable than in previous eras. The House committee still attracts some legislators committed to a strong institutional role for Congress. But it also has Members enamored of foreign travel and well-supported by interest groups with a stake in international matters. In the House, where Members face voters every two years and are more tied to parochial districts, getting Members to serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee has been a challenge for party leaders.(40)

The reason why these two key authorizing committees have lost much of their luster and influence is clear: they rarely pass any significant legislation. In fact, few major committees of Congress act less on legislation. With no significant treaties coming before the Senate in the last decade, the Foreign Relations panel garners less public and press attention. With no authorization debates, it has legislative power over fewer funds and programs. In the void left by decades of failing to pass even an annual authorization bill for the State Department, the committees and their public education functions, even their champions and leaders concede, are less relevant.(41) Today the work of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees, which employ several dozen senior staff experts on bilateral relationships and regional security challenges, is often “eviscerated by four appropriations subcommittee clerks, who are not foreign policy experts,” as one veteran legislator laments.(42) It should be noted, this phenomenon obtains on most legislation, not just on national security matters.

## General Pressure Answers

### Pressure CP---Fails---Top Level

#### Pressure fails---politics and self-interests.

Andrea Gilli 17. Post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. “Analysis.” Washington Post. 2-3-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/?utm\_term=.82d774c6d808 //EM

2) European countries pay more in defense overhead — All armed forces require military bases, training facilities, and administrative support. So in a continent with several small, national armed forces, overhead necessarily absorbs a higher fraction of resources than in the United States.

A solution for Europe would be to share some military assets and functions. In recent years, there have been important bilateral and multilateral initiatives in this respect — but there are strong political limits as well.

Countries have no guarantees their partners ultimately will support them in a military crisis. Thus, if sharing turns into a lock-in, countries run the risk of having access to fewer military capabilities than they might need. This explains why the width and depth of past initiatives have been generally limited.

However, this comes at the cost of intra-alliance inefficiency and thus an inferior capacity to generate military capabilities. An E.U. Defense Union could address these problems, but efforts to set this up face many of the same challenges: Why should a country tie its destiny to others? How can it ensure that its interests will be respected? And what tangible benefits would it observe in the short term, beside loss of jobs and income, following base closures and defense industry consolidation?

3) Implementing defense cooperation in Europe won’t be easy — Some analysts think that by promoting cooperation among NATO allies, any U.S. retrenchment from Europe would help address existing problems, but there are strong reasons to be skeptical.

With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon.

And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.

### Pressure CP---Fails

#### Threatening to cut-off aid pushes countries closer to Russia and fails to create concessions for the US.

Jessica Trisko Darden 17. Assistant Professor of International Affairs at American University’s School of International Service and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “President Trump wants to pressure allies by cutting foreign aid. That never works.” Washington Post. 8-25-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/25/president-trump-wants-to-pressure-allies-by-cutting-foreign-aid-that-never-works/ //EM

In his speech this week on his plans for the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, President Trump said he will use the threat of withdrawing foreign aid to put pressure on Pakistan to better support the American mission. Despite proposing dramatic cuts to the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development budgets, the Trump administration still requested $740 million in foreign aid for Pakistan, so this threat carries significant weight. Then, just one day later, news broke that the State Department is withholding $195 million in military aid for Egypt and has revoked another $95 million in foreign aid, seeming proof that we are willing to use aid as leverage.

But history shows that foreign aid is a poor way to get what we want. Threatening to cut off aid is almost certain to fail in bringing about political change in Egypt, Pakistan or any country that the United States has a strategic interest in supporting.

U.S. foreign aid has long been held out as a carrot to reward countries that embrace democracy and free markets. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a foreign aid agency created under George W. Bush, awards funds only to countries that are undertaking liberal political and economic reforms. During the Cold War, increased aid was also offered as a potential reward to failing states such as El Salvador. During a visit there by then-Vice President George H.W. Bush at the height of the country’s civil war, El Salvador was promised a massive increase in military assistance in exchange for the removal of military leaders suspected of human rights abuses and greater restraint by the government-aligned “death squad terrorists” who had killed thousands. While death squad killings did decline, the lull in violence was short lived. According to Human Rights Watch, there were 1,900 political killings and disappearances in El Salvador only a year after Bush’s visit. Promises of aid didn’t stop the violence, but Congress still approved the Reagan administration’s $61.7 million aid request to resupply the Salvadoran military, which was apparently running out of bullets.

The cutoff of aid has also been used as a stick — either threatened or enforced — to motivate countries to get back on track with U.S. objectives. In 2010, U.S. military aid to several Pakistani military units was cut as punishment for human rights abuses, including at least 300 extrajudicial executions in the Swat Valley. In a war for “hearts and minds,” killing civilians doesn’t help. But the Obama administration undermined the impact of the cuts by simultaneously negotiating a $2 billion counterterrorism package with Pakistan. The following year, the Obama administration suspended 40 percent of the $2 billion package in an attempt to secure greater cooperation from the Pakistani military in fighting against the Taliban — the very same thing Trump threatened.

Why does aid fail to change governments’ behavior? One of the reasons is that we give most of our foreign aid to countries that are strategically important to the United States — nations like Egypt and Pakistan. We need their continued cooperation on a range of issues, and this ultimately limits the amount of pressure we can apply. Sometimes there are developments beyond our control. Restrictions on foreign aid to Indonesia were eased in 2005 after a tsunami devastated parts of the country. Other times, the cuts in aid are too small to matter. In 2015, $5 million in aid was withheld from Mexico after the summary execution of 22 suspected gang members during the country’s ongoing drug war. But that amounted to 15 percent of U.S. support for the Mexican police and military under the Merida Initiative. The Mexican military continues to support local police forces, recently killing 17 in a firefight, which suggests that little has changed in the Mexican government’s strategy.

Often, cutting aid is simply not enough to force change. In Mali, the Obama administration suspended $70 million in bilateral aid — roughly half of U.S. aid to the country — after a 2012 coup. The State Department said aid would resume at normal levels once democratic rule was restored. The coup leader stepped down, but the military remained in power. Presidential elections were held more than a year later, after French military intervention in the country.

Pressuring countries through foreign aid can also drive them away from the United States. This fear was strongest during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was actively competing for influence in developing countries, but it’s still very real. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs has led to thousands of deaths. In response, the U.S. postponed millions of dollars in foreign aid. Duterte also rejected $280 million in aid from the European Union because it was pressuring him to improve human rights conditions. Aid can no longer buy political influence in the Philippines.

#### Non-escalatory is critical to get allies to agree

**O’Hanlon ’19** [Michael; October 2019; Senior Fellow and Director of Research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, adjunct Professor at Columbia and Georgetown University, Ph.D. in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University; Foreign Affairs, “Can America Still Protect Its Allies?” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-08-12/can-america-still-protect-its-allies>]

A sanctions-based strategy would be judicious and proportionate, but it would not be weak. Indeed, if Beijing or Moscow refused to either back down or otherwise resolve the dispute once the United States and its allies had deployed sanctions, Washington could raise the stakes. Recognizing that the aggressor state’s strategic aims had become fundamentally untrustworthy or hostile, Washington could seek to not only punish the perpetrator for its specific action but also limit its future economic growth. Over time, export controls and permanent sanctions could replace temporary punitive measures. This strategy would **require support** from key **U.S. allies** to be effective—one more reason why Washington needs to respond to these kinds of crises in a way that seems **judicious**, **patient**, and **non-escalatory**, so as to **strengthen its coalition** and not **scare away** key partners.

### Pressure CP---Fails---Spending

#### European countries will not increase defense commitments unliterally.

Andrea Gilli 17. Post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.. “Analysis.” Washington Post. 2-3-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/?utm\_term=.82d774c6d808 //EM

President Trump’s reassurances last week to U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May that the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) was not, in fact, “obsolete” are unlikely to have Europe taking up more of the defense burden, at least in the short term.

As discussed here in the Monkey Cage, national security adviser Michael T. Flynn wants to see other NATO members pay more of the cost of defending Europe. It’s not a new pitch, but such calls neglect the budgetary, financial and political barriers to enhanced military capabilities in Europe.

And such barriers will remain in place even if European countries succeed in implementing ambitious defense plans that include active measures to strengthen defense cooperation, endow the E.U. with defense capabilities and launch a common research fund.

Trump’s national security adviser wants to water down U.S. NATO commitments

The transatlantic gap in military capabilities — how much defense output the two sides of the Atlantic are able to generate, respectively — has three main causes that cannot easily be addressed:

1) European countries have limited defense budgets — On average, defense expenditure in Europe is just over 1 percent of GDP, while the U.S. defense budget is well above 4 percent of GDP. Would a U.S. retrenchment push European allies to fix this imbalance, and bring NATO members closer to the 2 percent threshold they pledged to move toward in 2014?

Maybe. But half of NATO’s members are small countries with small defense budgets, well below $2 billion per year. Thus, a substantial bump in their military spending won’t bring about a significant increase in Europe’s overall military investments. Estonia’s 2 percent GDP defense expenditure amounts to just $500 million, for instance. That might pay for the operational costs of a few of middle-sized U.S. warships, but wouldn’t push back a Russian invasion.

### Pressure CP---Turn

#### Threatening allies creates extended fears AND collapses deterrence.

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These responses from European leaders show that startling allies into thinking the United States will abandon them has influenced allies to increase defense spending in line with the 2014 Wales Pledge. However, in the long term, NATO policymaking should employ a balanced approach. If the United States brings its security guarantee of the alliance too much into question, Russia or other states may take action to test the United States’ resolve. During the Cold War, US leaders continually reaffirmed their commitment to allies, effectively deterring a Soviet invasion. Deterrence works best when allies clearly express their mutual obligations to all actors on the international stage.

## Aff

### Inducements CP---2AC

#### Inducements are “neither necessary nor sufficient” to persuade allies.

Eugene B. Kogan 13. Former Research Director at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, American Secretaries of State Project. “Coercing Allies: Why Friends Abandon Nuclear Plans.” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill. August 2013. <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/kogan-apsa-aug-2013.pdf> //EM

Conclusions Regarding Inducements

Inducements of any type are neither necessary nor sufficient for success. Neither limited nonmilitary rewards nor full-scale military reassurance led to success in the Taiwan and South Korean cases. The provision of limited military reassurance likewise failed to lead to success in Pakistan and Israel. As noted, it remains to be investigated if massive military reassurance can stop low-dependence allies.

The U.S. offered full military reassurance to South Korea by promising to defend it with nuclear weapons. To Taiwan, the U.S. only offered limited non-military rewards, such as renewal of licenses for Taipei’s civilian nuclear power reactors. From these two complete success cases, the conclusion can be drawn that inducements do not play as significant a role for highly-dependent allies as the scholarship on incentives leads us to expect. The logic of the literature suggests that provision of military reassurance, rather than non-military rewards, should increase the chances of success because such inducements are more likely to undercut the ally’s insecurity that impelled it to pursue the NWP. In other words, the incentives that satisfy an ally’s current and future security needs are more likely to persuade it to abandon the future gains it hopes to enjoy if it persists and is ultimately successful in making its nuclear weapons program operational. However, inducements did not play significant roles in either Taiwan or South Korea. Taiwan was forced into submission when it was offered minimal non-military rewards. Having politically abandoned Taipei, the U.S. made little effort to reassure it of its future intentions; furthermore, having promised non-military rewards, Washington provided them inconsistently.14 The Taiwan case thus suggests that in the cases of the most acute dependence by an ally, the U.S. can economize on incentives and achieve success primarily by coercive denial.

The South Korean case is unique in that the U.S. made two public, high-level pledges to defend it with nuclear weapons. Both of these features (public and high-level) made the pledges highly credible because the U.S. was issuing a direct warning to the Soviets and the North Koreans about the consequences of an attack on South Korea. As noted previously, the strength of this military reassurance becomes clear once we compare it to the U.S. approach to the ArabIsraeli conflict. In that case, President Kennedy made a diplomatically “balanced” statement, speaking for the security interests of both parties, which, as could be expected, failed to reassure the Israelis.

The failure of these public and high-level military guarantees to change the South Koreans’ minds was surprising. Military reassurance did not work because in 1978 Seoul still engaged in negotiations with France about purchasing the reprocessing facility. President Carter’s coercion by export controls was necessary to stop this renewed attempt in its tracks. Donald Gregg's account helpfully illustrates this point by describing the failure of an earlier reassurance attempt: "The visit to Seoul of President Ford and Henry Kissinger, in the fall of 1974, en route to a meeting with the Soviet leadership in Vladivostok, was very reassuring to Park, and the relationship was stabilized. The nuclear program was stopped later on, when South Korea had to go abroad to purchase items that it could not produce itself [thus making itself vulnerable to coercion by export controls]" (Gregg 2013, emphasis added). In sum, South Korea was the only case in which the U.S. explicitly pledged to strengthen its deterrent for an ally, and this military reassurance failed alone to bring about a nuclear change of heart in Seoul.

For Pakistan and Israel, Washington chose to provide only limited military reassurance (selected military aid) to strengthen their defensive capabilities, and equally unequivocally refused to provide anything approaching a deterrent capability that both states repeatedly requested. The U.S. knew that the arms it offered to Pakistan would not even allow it to balance—let alone, deter—India.15 The Israeli case also shows that the Kennedy Administration drew a clear line between a defensive buildup to bring Jerusalem to the point of parity with its Arab adversaries and massive military aid that Israel requested that could have allowed Israel to deter its enemies.

### Inducements CP ---Fails---Pressure Key

#### Pressure is critical to change their mind

**Joyner 14**, associate professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center of International Security at the Atlantic Council, (James, July 13th, 2014, (“Europe's Free Ride on the American-Defense Gravy Train”), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/europes-free-ride-the-american-defense-gravy-train-10864)

Demands to do something the receiver **doesn't want** to do—in this case, spend money that could go to social welfare programs or job creation on **defense**—are **useless** without an "**or else**." While senior American officials have been vaguely threatening for years that, if the Europeans didn't pony up for their own defense, the American taxpayer would stop doing it for them, it's long been obvious that the **threat** is **hollow**. To be sure, the United States has drawn down most of its huge pre-positioned force from the Cold War days. But there's simply no question that we'll respond **rapidly** in the event an ally is seriously threatened. So long as the Europeans know that's true, they're **unlikely** to **change** their **behavior**.

#### Reassurances undermines pressure

**Techau 15**, senior fellow and director of the Europe Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). As a foreign policy analyst, his research focuses on European integration and the EU's role in the world, German foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and security and defense issues. (Jan, September, 2015, “THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe”, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP\_252\_Techau\_NATO\_Final.pdf)

And so the dilemma remains: Europeans are still dependent on U.S. services for their security, and they are **not too bothered** by that fact. At the same time, Americans eagerly want Europeans to do more but **can’t really sanction them** in any **painful way** because, in the end, Europe is too strategically important for the United States to abandon it and leave its defense to the Europeans alone. Meanwhile, the **U**nited **S**tates feels the need to demonstrate to both Europeans and external powers that it **stands by** its **security commitments** to Europe and that it is ready to show strength when needed. This could well **undermine** the **strong American push** for Europeans to adopt the 2 percent metric. It could make the target less realistic by creating a **false sense of security** among Europeans that serves as an **incentive against**, not for, more **European defense spending**. In the absence of any political will from the Europeans to significantly beef up their defense, this impasse can basically only be broken in one of two ways: Either the United States is completely honest about its role in Europe and says it will continue to subsidize the continent’s security. This will probably mean an expensive, permanent recommitment to Europe over the next decade or so. Or the United States reduces its commitment, thereby risking a security crisis in Europe and the erosion of the cornerstones of its global posture. Neither of these two radical solutions will be embraced, of course. Instead, a third option will likely **continue** for some time: balancing the two and hoping that a blend of demonstrated American **solidarity**, **lecturing**, and **threats** of leaving will move the Europeans in the desired direction. This will be a shaky compromise. It can only last as long as NATO and the territory protected by Article 5 of the NATO treaty are not really threatened by anyone, and as long as the political consensus in Washington survives that says Europe, America’s geostrategic countercoast, must be always defended by the United States. Should the strategic situation in Europe change dramatically, or should America’s support for Europe erode, as some say it inevitably will, the status quo will become **unsustainable**. No one knows how long it will take to reach that point.

#### Loss is more persuasive than gain for states and sub-state actors

**Berejikian & Early 13**, \*PhD, Professor at the University of Georgia, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs \*\*PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science, Associate Dean for Research at the University at Albany, SUNY's Rockefeller College (Jeffrey Berejikian; Bryan Early, 2013, “Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve,” *Political Psychology*, 34.5)

Loss aversion is perhaps the most enduring and intuitive finding in behavioral decision theory (Kahneman et al., 1991; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Thaler, 1980). Experimental results suggest that the subjective **pain of loss** is **greater** than the benefit enjoyed from an equivalent gain, and scholars have extended this finding beyond the laboratory to explain a wide range of otherwise puzzling human behavior. Building upon these results, and adding new findings from the field of neuroscience, we seek to contribute to the theory-building enterprise in the study of foreign policy by constructing a gener- alizable theory of loss aversion and foreign policy behavior. The approach is consistent with the call to continue to develop theories of foreign policy built upon solid micro foundations (Hudson, 2005). Specifically, we hope to explain why policy makers stubbornly stand firm in their prosecution of some international disputes while in others they are willing to back down. The question is relevant for any number of foreign policy issues, such as territorial disputes, trade negotiations, conflicts over water rights, arms control, and **international treaty compliance**. Much of the research on loss aversion in the foreign policy literature has relied heavily upon case studies (Mercer, 2005). However, for some time scholars have suggested that loss aversion should produce broad patterns of behavior that could, in principle, be captured by statistical analysis (e.g., Jervis, 1992, Levy, 1996). Large-n analyses of broader behavior patterns thus remain fertile territory for research and contain the potential for advancing our understanding of how loss aversion affects foreign policy. As we demonstrate in this article, foreign policy behaviors, like trade disputes, can be analyzed using contemporary insights about loss aversion derived from neuroscience. Our analysis proceeds in the following manner. First, we build upon neuroscience research to argue that policy makers' aversion to accepting losses can affect their willingness to back down in international disputes. Cognitive science has convincingly demonstrated that individuals tend to **strive harder** and take more risks **to avoid losses** than they will to achieve similar gains. More recent neuroscientific findings show that unrealized expectations, like those observed **in a broken agreement**, are processed in the human mind in a way almost identical to actual losses. The result is that unmet expectations can also trigger loss aversion. Policy makers' resolve during disputes can thus vary if they perceive themselves to be defending previously established agreements from violations by their counterparts. Such violations diminish expected and hoped for gains, triggering loss aversion. Generalizing from this phenomenon, we then distinguish between preventive goals in which policy makers seek to protect against perceived losses versus promotive goals in which policy makers seek to make new gains. We theorize that policy makers should be less willing to back down in disputes initiated for preventive reasons than for promotive ones. We employ our theory to help explain cross-case variation in the level of resolve demonstrated by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in prosecuting Section 301 trade disputes designed to improve the terms of trade for U.S. businesses. Drawing on our preventive versus promotive framework, we hypothesize that the USTR should be less willing to back down in Section 301 disputes initiated because of breached trade agreements than those initiated to open up new markets. We test our theory via two different large-n analyses of a hundred Section 301 trade disputes. This approach is unique because - to the best of our knowledge - this study constitutes the first theoretically driven statistical analysis of loss aversion on foreign policy behavior grounded in a specific set of neuroscientific findings. In our first test, we conduct an analysis using binary logit, and, in the second, we employ a competing risks model. The two approaches allow us to model the effects of time on U.S. resolve in different ways. Our empirical results provide strong support for our theory, revealing that the U.S. Government was significantly less likely to back down in preventive disputes. Indeed, we find that the preventive/promotive distinction provides the single greatest determinant of U.S. resolve in prosecuting its Section 301 cases. We believe that this project offers a number of novel contributions. First, this study demonstrates that specific findings from cognitive neuroscience can make tangible contributions to explaining phenomena in **i**nternational **r**elations. Our study reveals that loss aversion and unrealized expecta- tions profoundly shape the behavior of even the most powerful states in the international system and that it does so in ways that traditional theoretical approaches are often blind to. This suggests that the loss-aversion-based framework we have developed may be able to yield novel insights into a host of other issue areas beyond the study of trade policy. Second, we test our arguments utilizing large-n statistical analysis - a method that has seen little use in evaluating cognitive and/or neuroscience theories of international relations (e.g., Drury, 2005). Moving forward with a program of quantitative analysis broadens the applicability of such theories and places them on equal analytical footing with rationalist models. Our project thus demonstrates that the empirical barriers that have to date "arrested" the development of the cognitive research agenda in international relations can be overcome (Walker, 2007). Lastly, our inquiry provides a number of case-specific insights explaining the comparative resolve demonstrated by the United States in prosecuting its Section 301 trade disputes and the policy implications that arise from them.

### Inducements CP---Fails---Bureaucracy

#### X.

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Security Assistance as Incentive Security assistance generates a classic principal-agent problem. In such relationships between a principal and its agent or proxy, there exists an information asymmetry where the agent inherently has more information about their own capabilities, activities, and interests than the principal. Agents, being rational actors, place their own interests above those of the principal and, in the absence of other incentives, behave accordingly. The greater the degree of misalignment, the more problematic this becomes. U.S. frustration during its 20-year war in Afghanistan over Pakistan’s perceived failure to adequately confront extremist groups, despite significant military aid, is an example of principal-agent problems at work. Fortunately, these are not insurmountable obstacles. Security assistance in the form of arms, equipment, or other support can be an effective incentive when it is used as a carrot to reward desired behavior, such as achieving a specific reform or taking some other action aligned with the interests of the principal. Alternately, such aid becomes a stick when it is withheld. An example of this carrot-and-stick approach being used effectively is described in Walter Ladwig’s study of U.S. assistance to the Philippines to combat the Hukbalahap rebellion in the decade following World War II. Heavy-handed tactics used by the local constabulary forces were a major factor driving support for the rebels. Recognizing this problem, U.S. advisors insisted on a series of reforms within the security forces as a precondition for further aid. These measures, along with the appointment of the reform-minded Ramon Magsaysay as defense chief, contributed to a far more effective counterinsurgency campaign and the eventual defeat of the rebel movement. This approach of using aid as an incentive stands in sharp contrast to Ladwig’s other case study, Vietnam, where U.S. aid was used as an inducement in the hope that it would eventually change partner behavior. In this case, U.S. advisors tried in vain year after year to cajole prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem and successor regimes to implement reforms that would have broadened domestic political support and made the South Vietnamese forces more effective. All the while, massive U.S. assistance continued to flow in with the expectation that it would eventually bring about a change of heart in the host-nation government. Such change never came, and the United States and its South Vietnamese proxies lost the war. The more recent U.S. experience in Iraq from 2003 until the withdrawal in 2011 contains echoes of Vietnam. David Lake’s study of that conflict suggests that provision of unconditional security assistance may still be America’s default setting. Despite massive volumes of military aid provided to the Iraqi government during this period, U.S. urging to reform the security forces and national government repeatedly failed. Nouri al-Maliki, prime minister during much of this period, resisted efforts to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive and apolitical, instead continuing to employ them as his own sectarian instrument. Again, the United States used an approach focused on training and equipping, known in the current lexicon as building partner capacity. The Iraqi government received assistance regardless of its effort, or lack thereof, to implement much-needed reform while the United States failed to use the leverage which hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance could buy. Several years later, the Iraqi military in which the United States had invested so much fell apart virtually upon first contact with the Islamic State’s irregular militia. The “building partner capacity” approach has two main flaws. First, it ignores fundamental problems, such as corruption, coup-proofing, and otherwise weak defense institutions which additional military capacity cannot overcome and may even exacerbate. Paradoxically, a focus primarily on capacity-building often fails to build meaningful, long-term capacity because it neglects underlying institutional problems. Second, it ignores principal-agent problems by assuming that once in possession of highly capable security forces, the partner will wield them in a manner aligned with U.S. interests. U.S. advisors and diplomats may recognize the pressing need for security sector reform in the partner. Unfortunately, the ingrained culture of U.S. security assistance seemingly relies on the false premise that with enough U.S. training and relationship-building, other countries’ militaries will voluntarily reform even though it is often not in their personal interests to do so.